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An Assessment of the Post 2015 Global Development Agenda 
 
ABSTRACT 
The international community plans to adopt a post-2015 agenda based on two previous 
agendas – the MDGs and the SDGs. This merger is motivated by similarities in their goals 
and the need for improved global governance. Both agendas are ill-defined and a gap exists 
between ends and means. The new unique agenda has numerous and varied goals which are 
potentially in conflict. Developed countries might face a dilemma between altruistic aid 
policies and the need for tied aid to encourage transformation towards a green economy. 
However, it can be argued that the new agenda provides scope for political compromise and 
flexibility. 
 
JEL Code : O1, O19, Q5, Q56. 
Keywords: Millennium Development Goals, Sustainable Development Goals, Global Public 
Goods, coordination failures, tied aid. 
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An Assessment of the Post 2015 Global Development Agenda 
1. Introduction 
In July 2012, the Secretary General of UN tasked a high-level panel of eminent persons with 
producing a proposal for what could be the post-2015 development agenda which will set the 
international community’s development agenda until 2030. There is an emerging consensus 
that, to be relevant, the post-2015 development agenda needs to go well beyond a poverty 
focus, given the dramatic changes in the international development landscape over the past 
two decades. In 1990, almost half of the population in developing regions lived on less than 
$1.25 a day. It is claimed (UN, 2014) that this rate dropped to 22 per cent by 2010, reducing 
the number of people living in extreme poverty by 700 million. However income distribution 
and relative poverty need to be carefully observed (OECD, 2013). Indeed, many of those who 
have escaped extreme poverty in the developing world are still poor, remain vulnerable and 
lack safety nets to cope with shocks. Moreover, concerns are mounting about the impact of 
greater inequality within developed, emerging and developing economies on growth, social 
cohesion and political stability. On the environmental front, the consequences of climate 
change are becoming more acute with each passing year. In addition, natural and man-made 
disasters in recent years have brought the issue of disaster risk reduction and resilience to the 
forefront of the development discourse. Therefore, the future development and sustainability 
goals are intended to encompass economic, environmental, and social dimensions and be 
applicable to all countries. In this way, they will unite the common interests of the prosperous, 
emerging and poor countries across the globe. Such proposal has been available since May 
2013 (UN, 2013) and is now being seriously considered by the international community for 
adoption before the expiry of the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals). This future 
unique agenda can be considered to be, to some extent, a merger of two existing agendas, 
namely the MDGs on the hand and the Rio+20 process or SDGs (Sustainable Development 
Goals) on the other. 
The MDGs were adopted by the UN in 2000 (UN, 2000). The eight MDGs range from 
halving extreme poverty rates to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal 
primary education. Its goals 1 to 7 are directly about human and economic development in 
LDCs. Its goal 8 concerns all countries and more specifically the developed ones since it 
promotes the implementation of a global partnership for development. The goal 7 is about 
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ensuring environmental sustainability; its presence shows that from 2000, the connection 
between the development of LDCs and sustainable development was already clearly 
established. Therefore, the future unique agenda can be seen as a step forward in that 
direction.  
During the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, governments agreed to launch a UN-led process to 
create a set of universal SDGs envisaged to be an international framework that will enable 
countries to better target and monitor progress across all three dimensions of sustainable 
development (social, environmental, and economic) in a coordinated and holistic way 
(UNCSD, 2012).  
Both processes, post-MDGs and SDGs, have poverty eradication within the context of 
sustainable development as a primary objective, with the aim of using a global goal 
framework to achieve this. Therefore, it is believed that the two processes are likely to be 
brought together to create one set of goals for the post-2015 development agenda. As a result, 
the high-level panel of eminent persons (denoted HLP in the following; its composition is 
available from UN, 2013: 66-68) recommended a transformation to end poverty through 
sustainable development. It outlines five transformational shifts, applicable to both developed 
and developing countries alike, including a new Global Partnership as the basis for a single, 
universal post-2015 agenda. These five transformational shifts are: 
- leave no one behind, 
- put sustainable development at the core, 
- transform economies for jobs and inclusive growth, 
- build peace and effective, open and accountable public institutions, and 
- forge a new global partnership. 
The first four shifts are where the focus for action is mostly at the country level, while the 
fifth transformative shift, forging a new global partnership, is an overarching change in 
international cooperation that provides the policy space for domestic transformations. These 
five shifts are considered as priorities by the HLP. However, to be more specific, the HLP has 
proposed 12 possible goals: (i) end poverty; (ii) empower girls and women and achieve 
gender equality; (iii) provide quality education and lifelong learning; (iv) ensure healthy lives; 
(v) ensure food security and good nutrition; (vi) achieve universal access to water and 
sanitation; (vii) secure sustainable energy; (viii) create jobs, sustainable livelihoods and 
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equitable growth; (ix) manage natural resource assets sustainably; (x) ensure good governance 
and effective institutions; (xi) ensure stable and peaceful societies; and (xii) create a global 
enabling environment and catalyze long-term finance. In addition to these 12 goals, 54 
national targets have also been defined (United Nations, 2013, Annex 1).  
It should be noted that since the HLP produced its report in 2013, many actors, such as the 
OECD, have highlighted some weaknesses in it. Thus, these actors1 have produced more 
recent recommendations which however adopt the same2 approach as the HLP’s one.  
Since the establishment of the MDGs, times have changed. The process of the shifting 
distribution of wealth has altered the way we think about the issues and the measurement of 
poverty reduction, social development and progress more broadly. The last decade has 
witnessed a rapid convergence in countries’ per capita income as parts of the developing 
world, especially because China and India grew faster than the advanced economies of the 
OECD. This growth and increasing heterogeneity within the developing world makes the so-
called North-South division an outdated concept. Nevertheless, large disparities persist in 
standards of living, and worries still continue about the sustainability and environmental costs 
of economic growth. It is therefore the purpose of this paper to critically analyze the post-
2015 global development agenda in relation to this recent evolution of aid policy and the 
challenges associated with it. 
The paper is organized as follows. The genesis of the post-2015 global development agenda is 
briefly presented in Section 1. Section 2 highlights the objectives and the underlying motives 
of the MDGs. Section 3 is devoted to the SDGs and their related problems of definition and of 
responsibility. Section 4 presents the shortcomings that are common to both current agendas. 
Section 5 reviews possible problems that will be encountered by the future unique agenda, 
such as coordination failure, lack of aid effectiveness and the increased tied aid. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. The Genesis: One World – One Agenda 
Many different reasons favor the adoption of a single agenda. Hence the advocacy is “one 
world-one agenda”. Indeed, such claim results from the two long-term main tendencies that 
have dominated the twentieth century. On the hand, there is economic globalization. It is a 
process that has been intensified over time by means of different flows at the international 
level, such as financial flows, trade of goods and services and human migrations. One of the 
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main consequences of this intensified process of economic globalization has been an 
increasing interdependency among stakeholders (such as nations-states, companies) and 
markets. Given this interdependence, it is nowadays impossible to imagine any country – 
especially a developing one - trying by itself to create economic growth and develop. Any 
national economic policy must take into account the huge influence of economic 
globalization. On the other hand, the twentieth century has seen the largest population 
increase ever experienced by humankind. There were approximately 2 billion people at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and 7 billion at its end. By the middle of this century, the 
global population may reach about 9 billion. This demographic increase has put more pressure 
on the economies and on the environment. Indeed, it is a great challenge for the humanity to 
feed and to get jobs and incomes for everyone. This challenge is moreover reinforced by the 
pressure put by this population increase on natural resources which has led to environmental 
degradation. 
It is therefore obvious that both agendas, MDGs and SDGs, need to be linked. Indeed, many 
examples demonstrate the interconnection between them. People are fed by agriculture but 
agriculture depends on ecosystems. Similarly, water quality is central in any ecosystem and it 
is, at the same time, important for the eradication of poverty since it prevents various diseases. 
What the previous examples show, is that many challenges are common to both agendas and 
are global challenges. In fact, many examples, if not most, have the character of global or 
international public goods (GPGs) (Kaul et al., 2003); they transcend national borders and 
often affect all, or at least a multitude of countries. In other words, the existence of GPGs can 
be considered to a key for framing the post-2015 development agenda (Kaul, 2013). Examples 
of GPG-type policy issues are global climate stability, international financial stability, 
communicable disease control, peace and security, the institutional architecture of 
international trade and finance, global communication and transportation systems, and the 
fulfillment of global norms such as basic human rights. The study of GPGs raises a question 
common to both agendas and central for each one3, namely identifying the governance 
requirements posed by global challenges. The eradication of poverty needs to tackle the 
central problem of better governance at the world level, especially among donors’ countries to 
avoid fragmentation of their action and coordination failures. Better governance is also 
needed to tackle at the world level environmental degradation. Since there is one world, 
improving its governance seems to require a single agenda. 
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3. Aid Policy: Heterogeneous Objectives and Underlying Motives 
There is a huge literature about aid policy: some scholars (e.g. Easterly, 2001; 2006) claim 
that aid has done more harm than good, and others(e.g. Sachs, 2005) project a positive view 
of aid policy. 
Heterogeneous Agendas and Motives 
The nature of official overseas aid is heterogeneous. There is global multilateral aid, nation to 
nation aid, and from particular nations to groups of nations, and from groups of nations (such 
as the EU) to individual nations and groups of nations. All this aid is not necessarily driven by 
the same agenda or motives. Although unilateral government aid is claimed to be altruistic, it 
is not always so. In fact, much of it is based on self-interest. For example, aid to some Pacific 
Island countries is intended to act as an incentive to allow favorable access of the donor 
country to their natural resources (such as tuna, forests and minerals) or in return for votes 
from the country receiving aid on international bodies. For example, China and Taiwan 
provide aid to selected countries to facilitate resource-access. Japan is supposed to buy votes 
on the International Whaling Commission by giving overseas aid (and possibly by giving 
bribes) (Drezner, 2001). Therefore altruism is clearly not a strong motive in all cases.  
Furthermore, individual countries or groups give aid to selected LDCs to prevent other 
countries increasing their political influence on them. Australian, French, New Zealand and 
US aid in the Pacific counters the possible influence of China, Japan and so on.  
Another controversial matter is to what extent do countries use aid programs as a cover for 
spying4 or for collecting useful information about host countries. Aid may also be given in an 
attempt to stem ‘illegal’ migrants from LDCs, either environmental refugees or economic 
ones. Given how closely located Papua New Guinea (PNG) is to Australia, the latter has an 
interest in stemming contagious diseases in PNG. There are, for example, concerns that if 
Ebola should reach the Pacific islands that it will increase the risk of its occurrence in 
Australia. For similar reasons, i.e. because "the introduction or spread of the disease would 
pose an imminent and severe risk to public health in Canada” (Declaration of the Canadian 
immigration authorities), Canada on October 31, 2014 stopped issuing visas to people from 
the West African countries at the heart of the Ebola outbreak; Australia did it earlier in 
October. 
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Donor country also has an interest in the political stability of its near neighbors. In fact, some 
aid may be made to promote political stability of receiving countries out of self interest of 
donors, regardless whether these receiving countries are important trading partners or not. The 
provision of global pure public goods can also be a motive for aid; regional public goods are 
also relevant, for example, environmental spillovers from neighboring countries. However, 
the production of public goods (either global or regional) is subject to free riding (see Section 
5). 
Even “emerging” countries like South Korea, (one of the few countries which have 
successfully transitioned from a recipient to a donor in the last two decades) are experiencing 
conflicts5 between altruism and self-interest. Indeed Korea’s ODA displays a low ODA/GNI 
ratio, a high percentage of concessional loans compared to grants, a high portion of tied aid, 
regional bias, and a relatively large number of recipients. 
Most multilateral actors – e.g. the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the 
European Commission (EC) – have other interests beyond development effectiveness. The EC 
is concerned with projecting a common European vision in international development and 
increasing the visibility of the European Union in international affairs, while the DAC tries to 
protect its role and relevance in the field of international development. 
Varied stakeholders influence foreign aid. Domestic political pressure groups favoring 
increased overseas aid constitute influences. Some may be altruistic but many also have a 
self-interested motive because they obtain economic or social benefits from such 
programmes. The existence of such groups leads to several queries: who are their main 
clients, how does political lobbying affect the agenda of global public bureaucrats and how do 
they exert their influence? Many NGOs are in this situation, and also domestic public servants 
involved in the distribution of foreign aid have an interest in its maintenance. Indeed, one may 
asked to what extent do bureaucracies involved in aid promote ‘desirable’ goals by acting in 
their self interest? If it is true, as pointed out by Adam Smith, that self interest can be 
compatible with the pursuance of desirable goals, this may or may not apply to ODA. 
Moreover, it seems that altruism often evolves to a form of self-interest or exists together with 
some amount of self-interest.  
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Tied Aid 
Since its creation in 1961, the OECD Development Assistance Committee has worked to 
improve the effectiveness of its members’ aid efforts. One major issue has been whether aid 
should be freely available to buy goods and services from all countries (“untied aid”), or 
whether aid should be restricted to the procurement of goods and services from the donor 
country (“tied aid”). Tying aid is condemned by DAC because evidence has shown that it 
increases the costs of a development project by as much as 15-30%. In addition, the 
administration of tied aid requires larger bureaucracies in both the donor and recipient 
countries. Untied aid avoids these unnecessary costs by giving recipient countries the freedom 
to use their aid to procure goods and services from virtually any country. Despite its efforts to 
accelerate the untying of aid by monitoring progress and offering guidance and 
recommendations, the OECD (2009) recognized in its 2009 review that6 : “Good progress is 
being made in untying aid in general and in reporting on the tying status of aid. 79% of all 
ODA is now untied, 17% is still tied and the tying status of only 4% of aid is not reported”. In 
fact, many OECD countries face a dilemma because East Asian countries focus on tied aid. 
China, for example sends Chinese to developing countries to complete infrastructure projects 
with most of the equipment and so on coming from China. The locals gain extra infrastructure 
but possibly little else. Tied aid results in imperfect competition among donors’ countries 
since it can be viewed as a subsidy given by the donor country in order to promote its exports. 
This feeling about tied aid is reinforced by the fact that secrecy surrounds many East Asian 
countries aid agreements with LDCs. 
Although direct overseas aid (which is not multilateral) may not be tied, many of the 
economic benefits are still obtained by citizens of the donor countries. They gain by way of 
consultancies, from on-the-ground assistance to LDCs, and appropriate a large part of the aid 
funds for its administration. As pointed out by Milner and Tingley (2010, p. 204): “many 
studies of economic aid point out that domestic interests within donor countries seem to have 
a significant impact on how much and where aid is delivered, as domestic groups 
presumptively gain from these flows”. Similarly, Alesina and Dollar (2000) found 
considerable evidence that the direction of foreign aid is dictated by political and strategic 
considerations and that colonial past and political alliances are the major determinants of 
foreign aid. Economic needs and policy performance of the recipients’ countries are only 
second-order determinants. Furthermore, economic stagnation, increased unemployment and 
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mounting public sector debt in most OECD countries are putting governments7 under 
increasing public pressure to reduce ODA budgets and to use ODA in more explicit pursuit of 
their own economic and political interests. 
An Incomplete Agenda 
Many criticisms have been made of the MDGs. It has been claimed that they constitute an 
incomplete agenda. They are entirely concerned with development and poverty eradication. 
MDG 1-6 aim to achieve a basic level of income, education, gender equality and health but 
are only partially concerned with protecting our common environment. While some attention 
is paid to environmental sustainability (MDG 7), not enough is given to the economic and 
social dimensions of sustainable development. Moreover, some topics are completely left out 
such as peace, security and disarmament as well as human rights, democracy and good 
governance – despite the presence of MDG 8 for the latter. In addition, the MDGs framework 
overlooks inequality in income and access to opportunity (including access to infrastructure) 
and remains silent on how to meet basic human needs — and beyond — through self-
sustaining growth and development. 
4. Sustainable Development: Problems of Definition and Responsibility 
A major problem is that the agenda does not say what sustainable development is. There are 
many definitions of SD (see, for example, Tisdell, 2005, Ch. 11). Furthermore, if there is 
agreement on what constitutes sustainable development, opinions often differ about the ways 
to achieve it. Some economists want strong limits on resource use whereas others feel that this 
is not necessary to achieve sustainable development. There are also controversies about the 
extent to which sustainable development is desirable (see, for example, Beckerman, 1994). 
Depending on the definition of what constitutes desirable development, sustainable 
development paths are not always the most desirable ones. Furthermore, deciding what is the 
most desirable development path involves significant value judgments and opinions differ on 
these normative aspects. Such problems are usually not taken into account in global agendas. 
These problems of SD definition are clearly present in some (not most) of the 12 goals 
suggested by the HLP8. Indeed, what does ‘ensuring secure sustainable energy’ imply? What 
is ‘equitable growth’? For example, how much weight should be put on the welfare of future 
generations compared to current ones? Is it desirable to have sustainable livelihoods if this 
results in a much reduced level of income? 
10 
 
It is possible that by following SDGs some LDCs will generate insufficient economic growth 
to escape the Malthusian trap, for example, if they utilize their natural resources sustainably 
or very slowly and deplete their non-renewable natural resources. Indeed, the DACs did not 
develop by adopting sustainable use strategies and many also drew heavily on the natural 
resources of their colonies or other countries through international trade. Sustainable use 
strategies could slow the development of LDCs and their ability to reduce poverty. China’s 
recent economic growth was not based on sustainable use policies. Sustainable use policies 
could result in continuing impoverishment of many LDCs. 
Economic Globalization and the Trail of Responsibility 
The most developed countries have been accused of exploiting the natural resources of 
developing countries. This was particularly relevant while imperial (colonial) systems were in 
place. Today, some of the rapidly developing LDCs seem to be exploiting the natural 
resources (and sometimes labor) of poorer LDCs. For example, China is a major exporter of 
furniture and relies to a considerable extent on imported timber from Russia, some other 
developed countries, as well as LDCs. This adds to deforestation. In 2006, China imported 
approximately two-thirds of its logs from the Russian Federation. Papua New Guinea 
accounted for 6.4% and Myanmar for 3.2% (State Forestry Administration, 2009, p. 25). 
Other similar examples are available for most Asian countries. China and other Asian 
countries are repeating what many European countries did in the past to get economic growth 
but it is driven not by territorial imperialism but market imperialism. Several examples are 
available, and the actions of the exploiting LDCs are adding to the unsustainability of 
development. A further twist to this scenario is that the resources taken from the poorest 
LDCs may be often put into manufactured goods that are supplied to more developed 
countries. Therefore, the trail of ‘responsibility’ gets longer. Many consumers have no idea of 
the environmental consequences of their purchases, and possibly many do not care. This is a 
problem thrown up by the market system. Hayek (1948) extolled the market system arguing 
that all buyers need to know the relative prices of commodities for it to work efficiently. 
However, this assumes that environmental effects are insignificant as well as other possible 
social concerns about how commodities are supplied (Tisdell, 2011a). 
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5. Some Weaknesses Common to Both Existing Agendas 
The development of global development agendas is particularly important for multilateral 
development agencies, because it provides them with a political purpose. Indeed, a major 
concern of such is their own survival and growth. The theory developed by Niskanen (1971) 
has some relevance here. He stated, initially considering the internal US situation, that the 
primary actors were bureaucrats and members of relevant Congressional committees. 
Bureaucrats seek to maximize objectives - income and perks - defined in terms of the agency's 
discretionary budget – the discretionary budget is the difference between the budget the 
Congress gives an agency and the cost to the agency of producing its output. In other words, 
bureaucracy behaves like a monopoly firm facing a downward sloping demand curve for the 
quantity of bureaucratic services as a function of the “price”. Committee members maximize 
re-election odds; since the politicians on the committee are there by choice, they will tend to 
be interested in an inefficiently large output from agencies under their jurisdiction (so they are 
willing to give more money than the full Congress would, but they expect it to be used as 
efficiently as the full Congress would). As a result of this interaction, bureaucrats want an 
oversized budget. Their overseers in Congressional committees want an oversized budget 
(relative to what the Congressional median would want). So we get an equilibrium. The 
implication for efficiency is that Congress will over-consume its common pool resource (tax 
dollars), leading to a growing spending deficit. Hence, Niskanen’s model gave a simple 
explanation for bureaucratic inefficiency (high price relative to marginal cost) and under-
provision of services. 
Niskanen’s theory can be applied to foreign aid. The international public (civil) services are 
interested in the survival and growth of their own bureaucracies. It helps to have a set of 
objectives or purposes because rationalism is the name of the game: means are needed to meet 
desirable ends. Therefore, if they can come up with a set of seemingly desirable ends, then 
they are well on the way to making out a case to be given the means. However, at the same 
time, the objectives (in the multilateral setting) must not be too specific – as is apparent in the 
case of the future post-2015 unique agenda. This leaves room for political maneuvering and 
can accommodate a range of somewhat different reviews of donors. Their vagueness plays a 
significant role in political compromise. 
As stated by Easterly (2002), the environment that created aid bureaucracies led those 
organizations to define their output as money disbursed rather than service delivered and to 
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engage in obfuscation, spin control, (like always describing aid efforts as “new and 
improved”) and amnesia so that there is little learning from the past. In Easterly’s opinion the 
heart-breaking reality of aid isn’t so much that it didn’t work as that we in rich countries 
didn’t really care whether it did. 
Differentiated Background and Experience 
There has been considerable criticism of the MDGs since 2000, and some of the more virulent 
criticisms are in fact not against the MDGs per se, but against the ideology of development 
(Easterly, 2007). Despite these criticisms, one can however consider that the MDGs have 
some merit, because they have been acted on worldwide and have partly been reached. They 
do help target and monitor aid. In other words, this development agenda is not purely about 
theory; it exists in practice. It has been experimented with and this experience is valuable.  
Note that before the adoption of MDGs in 2000 by developed countries, Western countries 
had been engaged in development aid since the end of the Second World War. Until the end 
of the cold war, in 1989, these policies consisted mainly of ODA. Since then aid from the 
private sector has grown large. Therefore, the public as well as the private sectors of 
industrialized countries have had a quite long experience in development aid policies. 
Many – and especially the aid bureaucracy - consider that the fact that the MDGs have been 
partially met as being meritorious. However, the fulfillment of these goals is not entirely due 
to foreign aid. For example, China’s development in recent decades did not rely on much 
foreign aid but its development made a big difference to the achievement of the global MDG 
goals. Likewise, some other low income countries achieved the MDG goals mainly as a result 
of influences other than foreign aid. Overall, the impact of aid on the partial achievement of 
MDG goals may have been miniscule compared to other factors, even if the aid bureaucracy 
might suggest otherwise. However, there may have been indirect beneficial effects, e.g. 
suggesting desirable goals for governments and having them compare their results with those 
of other countries. 
The international community has had an interest in sustainable development for several 
decades and this was strengthened by the first Earth Summit held in 1992 at Rio. 
Nevertheless, international agreements on topics related to SD have been hard to achieve, as 
was illustrated by the collapse of Copenhagen summit on climate change (held in December 
2009). Moreover, when some international agreements on SD are finally reached, their 
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implementation and enforcement are very difficult to obtain as is illustrated by the Kyoto 
protocol9 adopted on December 1997 which placed a heavier burden on developed nations 
under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. In other words, many 
intentions, agreements and agendas are dedicated to SD but few of these are enforced and 
therefore the international community’s finds in that domain that achievements fall short of 
the MDGs. The real problem is that most people alive now are not prepared to make 
economic sacrifices to benefit future distant generations and/or do not consider it to be 
necessary. The motivations to increase current income via economic growth are very strong 
and given the nature and structure of our market system, this economic growth is needed to 
avoid growing unemployment (Tisdell, 1999, Ch. 6). Not many politicians want to slow 
growth to benefit distant generations. Furthermore, politicians choose between objectives 
relevant to sustainable development. For example, the CCP in China has chosen strong 
economic growth to promote social (political stability) at the expense of environmental 
sustainability. Now it is saving some of its own environmental resources by using those of 
others thereby adding to a global problem. This is what many developed countries did, 
however. 
The weakness of the SDGs agenda is clearly illustrated by the Rio 2012 ideas on goals and 
indicators (UNCSD, 2012). In its report, the HLP itself recognized that “For twenty years, the 
international community has aspired to integrate the social, economic, and environmental 
dimensions of sustainability, but no country has yet achieved patterns of consumption and 
production that could sustain global prosperity in the coming decades” (United Nations, 
2013, p. 8). 
PCD – Policy Coherence for Development 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, many commitments about policy coherence 
for development (PCD) have been made in various contexts. However, results have been 
modest, as governments in the North have found it difficult to go beyond their short-term 
political and economic interests. Indeed, poor outcomes are related to the widened agenda in 
international development and the domestic structures within individual countries. One may 
also claim that the search for PCD is in fact an attempt to shift responsibilities from aid 
agencies to actors involved in other public policy areas affecting developing countries. 
In relation to sustainability, it could be argued that many DACs are hypocritical. On the one 
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hand, they provide some (but little) aid to slow deforestation in LDCs but at the same time, 
they engage in international trade10 that accelerates deforestation and which increases the 
amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. The lack of policy coherence therefore also concerns the 
SDG agenda. 
Ends and Means: a Recurrent Discrepancy 
Both existing development agendas involve another weakness relative to the discrepancy 
between their goals – and their means – i.e. the financing effectively provided. This can be 
illustrated from the decision taken by the UN in 1970 (OECD/DAC, 2010) which set a goal 
for its higher income members to provide 0.7% of their GNP for development aid11. Since 
1970, this target has been continually reaffirmed by the UN and by leaders of countries and of 
international institutions. Even with the adoption of the MDGs in 2000 – in which goals are 
expressed in terms of result or impact and not in terms of means – “0.7” still refers to the 
repeated commitment of the world's governments to commit 0.7% of rich-countries (GNP) to 
ODA. However, except for a few Scandinavian countries, all the other countries have never 
reached this level of financing. In other words, the 0.7% target has never been met 
collectively (0.29% of GNI of all DAC in 2012) (European Parliament, 2014: 16). This 
example is not isolated but is significant. It leads to a central question without a clear answer, 
and therefore to a central problem: is it credible to build a future unique development agenda 
with goals from two existing agendas in which the required funding has never been reached? 
6. Some Potential Shortcomings of the Future Unique Post-2015 Development Agenda 
As claimed by the HLP itself, the unique post-2015 development agenda is based on five 
transformational shifts which can be illustrated by twelve main goals. In others words, even if 
there is a unique global agenda, it will include many goals, some being more related to the 
MDGs and the other being more related to SDGs.  
One Agenda, Many Goals 
While it is proposed to have one development agenda, questions arise about the relationships 
between these different goals. Are they all consistent or not, and if they are consistent, are 
they complementary or substitutes and, if it is the latter, to what extent are they substitutes? Is 
there some form of competition among goals? This question is of great importance. Indeed, 
there are very few examples of economic sectors – except arguably ecotourism for instance – 
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where goals are fully consistent, i.e. economic sectors which are able to create jobs and 
wealth in a competitive manner and to protect environment at the same time. Even for 
ecotourism, the results can be contentious. For example, rich eco-tourists often arrive by plane 
and outside the eco-tourist area have a negative environmental footprint. Sometimes projects 
designated as involving ecotourism only qualify in name. For instance, local people are 
removed to make way for ecotourism developments, e.g. the displacement of Bushmen (the 
!Kung) in Botswana. 
Even if some goals are consistent, it should be noted that correlation does not necessarily 
imply causality. If causality exists among goals, then some kind of ranking or hierarchy is 
needed between them. Agricultural policy can illustrate how such hierarchy emerges. If 
agricultural development is unsustainable, it may be possible to feed people (and thus 
contribute to reducing poverty) in the short-term but in the long-term environments will be 
destroyed and poverty may increase again. Therefore, in order to reduce poverty in the long-
term, it is necessary to have priority goals in the short-term, namely to concentrate efforts on 
sustainable agriculture. Here the causality is clearly from sustainable agriculture to the 
eradication of hunger and poverty. The extent to which sustainable agriculture is compatible 
with these goals is unclear. For example, is sustainable intensification of agriculture possible? 
The problem of causality is in fact much more important if we analyze in detail the various 
goals present in both agendas because some of them are final goals while others are 
intermediate goals – or preconditions. Indeed, the majority of the MDGs refer to 
improvements in the wellbeing of individuals, they are thus near final goals of human 
development (education, health, access to water) to be measured at the micro-level. The SDGs 
agenda also involves such goals (water, biodiversity), but also ones that refer to the 
preservation or establishment of global public goods (limiting deforestation, improving 
financial stability) that can thus only be measured at the macro-level. The latter are not near 
final objectives, but preconditions for sustainable development. One can therefore wonder if it 
is consistent to put final goals and preconditions side by side in a single agenda? 
Proponents of an SDG agenda further criticize some aspects of the MDGs. They claim that 
the latter are generally short to medium-term and thus run counter to policies that are oriented 
towards sustainability, which necessarily have to be inherently longer-term. Moreover, they 
consider that central areas of sustainable policies – chiefly environmental objectives – are not 
reflected sufficiently in the MDGs. 
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Aid Effectiveness? 
During the last decades, many concerns12 have been raised to the effectiveness of aid. One 
main criticism is that aid delivery fails to give enough attention to the behavior of the 
recipients, e.g. the poor (Banerjee and Duflo, 2012).A prime message of these authors is the 
need to empirically examine the behavior of the poor in order to devise policies that may 
assist them. The poor do not act in the way suggested by some stereotypes: e.g., supplying 
opportunities to the poor does not always result in the poor taking advantage of these 
opportunities. They point out that some measures of the delivery of benefits to the poor can be 
very misleading. An example is school enrolments. Enrolled students in developing countries 
often fail to attend school regularly, teachers often do likewise and may not teach when they 
are present, and so on. The situation is much more complicated than is realized. Therefore this 
approach does at the very least signify a remarkable significant shift in academic development 
economics. The agenda of this new literature can be summarized as follows: take one step at a 
time and make sure it is a positive step. As stated by Easterly (2005, p. 7): “I believe this shift 
in focus and ambition, which may have been an accidental consequence of the commitment to 
the RE (randomised evaluation) methodology, is actually a greater contribution to the 
development literature than the methodological one”. 
Another main criticism is the lack of coordination in donors’ policies. The latter reflects not 
only the lack of governance at the world level with respect to national aid policies but also the 
fragmentation of aid policy at the national level13. Efforts of the international community to 
improve coordination and aid effectiveness have led to the adoption of the Declaration of 
Paris (OECD, 2005) and to subsequent declarations at world summits held at Accra (2008) 
and Busan (2011). Despite these efforts, aid effectiveness has not really been improved. The 
main reason is that there is no division of labor among rich countries with respect to aid 
policies. With a unique development agenda, including numerous and varied goals, derived 
from MDGs and SDGs, one can wonder whether the coordination failures previously 
observed about aid policies are going to disappear or, on the contrary are going to be much 
more important. In other words, what will be the division of labor among countries – 
developed and developing ones – enabling the post-2015 development agenda to be 
successful? While all the transformational goals seem desirable, on closer analysis, they are 
somewhat vague14, and this leaves this argument rather open. Politically, this may be 
motivated by the desire to provide scope for compromise between the parties. 
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Another central question is about the link between goals and related policies. Indeed, it is 
obvious that some goals are common to the MDGs and the SDGs, as illustrated for example 
by MDG 7. Both existing agendas are concerned about global challenges, i.e. they share the 
overlapping goals. However, the interdependence between goals does not necessarily mean 
that a unique policy should be applied. In order to illustrate this claim, one can consider the 
analysis of economic growth in a simple economy. From the input-output analysis, it is 
possible to know the interdependence between key sectors such as agriculture and industry. 
We also know, at least from the Industrial Revolution, that this interdependence is at the core 
of economic growth. However, many countries have adopted not one but two separated 
policies, one for the agriculture sector and the other for the industry. Even if goals are 
common, they do not imply the implementation of the same policy. Foreign aid, on the one 
hand, and cooperation about GPGs on the other hand, need to be governed according to its 
own logic. In the case of development cooperation, the primary focus must be on the country 
context, and in the case of GPGs provisioning, it must be on the good whose provision level 
or shape is to be enhanced. 
Production of GPGs and Free Riding 
Following the seminal work of Samuelson (1954) on public goods15, the notion of global 
public goods appeared sometime in the early 1990s in the context of global environmental 
issues (e.g. Nordhaus, 1994). GPGs are commodities for which the cost of extending the 
service to an additional person is zero and for which it is impossible or expensive to exclude 
individuals from enjoying these. What is central about GPGs is that if some problems arise for 
them, there is no market or government mechanism that contains both political means and 
appropriate incentives to implement an efficient outcome. While the provision of global pure 
public goods can be a motive for aid, there is the problem of free riding. Indeed, in the 
conventional case, stemming from the original Samuelson 1954 model, comes where the 
production of the GPGs is simply the sum of the contributions of the different producers. This 
is exemplified by global warming, where total emissions are equal to the sum of the emissions 
of different parties. In this additive case, efficient provision requires the familiar rule that 
everyone contribute to the point where private marginal cost equals social marginal benefit. 
Thus the additive case would provoke the standard syndrome of free riding and under-
provision of the public good, with small and poor countries under-providing more than large 
and rich countries (Nordhaus, 2006). 
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Aid policy: A Dilemma? 
Countries that are DAC members mostly claim that their aid policy is based on pure altruism. 
For instance, these countries commit to not tying the aid they provide to developing countries. 
However, such claims are dubious because even untied aid can be motivated by self-interest 
(see Section 2) and there still exist many examples of tied aid. Concerning the latter, often 
businesses in donor countries favor tied aid because it increases their chances of getting 
contracts. The same is true of domestic NGOs. Universities can also benefit. For example, 
scholarships for students from developing countries are usually only tenable in the donor 
country. The lion’s share of research monies for research projects in LDCs usually go to the 
nationals of the donating country.  
On the other side, the SDGs agenda necessitates a rapid shift to sustainable patterns of 
consumption and production, harnessing innovation, technology, and the potential of private 
business to create more value and drive sustainable growth. Despite the stated aspirations of 
the international community in the twenty years to bring about this transformation, little has 
changed. The main problem is that companies’ strategies are profit-oriented and that 
sustainable development is not yet (sufficiently) valued by markets. Moreover, the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities, as set out in principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, 
puts a heavier burden on rich countries and gives them incentives to behave in a non-
cooperative manner, leading to sub-optimal outcomes. In order to encourage the shift towards 
a green economy, the governments of rich countries are therefore constrained to subsidize 
companies delivering foreign aid. With a unique development agenda, the rich countries are 
therefore potentially facing a dilemma. On the one hand, their aid policy is based on altruism 
and they condemn tied aid. On the other hand, they must provide fiscal incentives and 
subsidies to their firms to promote a global green economy. In the future, there may be a great 
temptation for any rich country to tie its aid given to poor countries, i.e. to mandate that the 
aid be spent on sustainable goods, services and technologies produced by firms of the donor 
country. 
7. Conclusion 
The creation of a single post-2015 global development agenda has merit if one believes that 
policies are best formulated in the context of rational decision-making models in which 
defined ends or objectives should be related to available means. From a deterministic point of 
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view, the adequacy of such models depends on the objective being well defined, their means 
being identified and the consequences of utilizing means being adequately related to the ends. 
While the proposed post-2015 development agenda goes some way towards satisfying the 
conditions for rational choice (based on the type of model), it does not satisfy the conditions 
fully, as has been pointed out.  
Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded that this is a failing. Not all scholars are convinced that 
the type of rational decision-making model involving a specific formulation of means and 
ends is in fact rational. Lindblom (1977; 1959) has persuasively argued that such an approach 
is not practical given social conflicts (requiring political compromises) and bounded 
rationality (Tisdell, 1981, pp. 15-17). Not only do the diverse priorities of nations have to be 
satisfied as far as global development policy is concerned but some flexibility in goals is 
needed to allow for changing circumstances including changes in public opinion. It can be 
concluded that by not fully satisfying the rational choice model, the proposed post-2015 
global development agenda involves a sensible compromise between a tightly specified 
rational choice model and a more open-model for social choice.  
8. Notes 
1. For instance the OECD has started work on the paper series 'OECD and Post-2015 
Reflections.' The series entails an overview paper and eleven elements (organized into two 
categories: outcomes, including principles and underlying future goals; and tools for 
achieving existing and developing future goals), each of which focuses on different areas 
that are crucial for the success of the post-2015 development agenda: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/post-2015.htm#Current  (Accessed October 14, 2014). 
2. One notable exception is European Parliament (2014). 
3. As shown by the numerous discussions and controversies about the MDG 8 devoted to the 
global partnership for development. 
4. E.g. the programme of the US for polio vaccination in Pakistan was a cover for spying. 
5. Chun, et al. (2010). 
6. From 1999-2001 to 2008, the proportion of untied bilateral aid rose progressively from 
46% to 82%. 
7. Kawai and Takagi (2004) have illustrated this situation for the case of Japan’s ODA. 
8. See the Introduction of the present paper. 
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9. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and entered into 
force on 16 February 2005. The detailed rules for the implementation of the Protocol were 
adopted at COP 7 in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 2001, and are referred to as the "Marrakesh 
Accords." Its first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012. 
10. For example, as pointed out by Tisdell (2011b) the EU imports palm oil for various 
purposes (e.g. production of biofuel in Germany) but this increases the demand for palm 
oil which accelerates deforestation, a result opposites to the recommendations of the 
United Nations Collaborative Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD Program). This program was 
created in September 2008 to assist developing countries to build capacity to reduce 
emissions and to participate in a future REDD+ mechanism. For the purpose of this 
strategy, REDD+ refers to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. 
11. United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-Fifth Session, Second Committee: compare 
documents A/C.2/L.1104 of 25 September 1970 and A/C.2/L.1104/Rev.1 of 14 October 
1970. 
12. See e.g. Munro (2005), Andersen and Therkildsen (2012). 
13. It has been claimed that on average, any rich country had partnerships with about 100 
developing countries. 
14. The twelve possible goals are rather more definite but many can be interpreted differently. 
For example, views can differ about what constitutes good governance, and the means for 
achieving these goals do not seem to be explored as yet. 
15. Public goods have the two key properties of non-rivalry and non-excludability. However 
economists often refer to goods that do not fully meet the two criteria, but have significant 
public attributes, as ‘impure’ public goods. Goods that are non-rival but excludable are 
often called ‘club goods’, and those that are non-excludable but rival are called ‘common 
pool resources’. 
 
9. List of Notations 
CCP : Chinese Communist Party 
DAC : Development Assistance Committee 
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GDGs : Global Public Goods 
HLP : High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons 
LDC : Least Developing Countries 
MDGs : Millennium Development Goals 
ODA : Official Development Assistance 
PCD : Policy Coherence for Development 
SDGs : Sustainable Development Goals 
UN : United Nations 
UNCSD : United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development 
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